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Abstract:  This paper presents a framework of the 
determinants analysis of the control of interorganizational 
relationships (IOR). While drawing on transaction cost 
analysis and resource-dependency theory, the authors 
analyze the effects of asset specificity, environmental 
uncertainty, level of dependence and trust on coordination 
costs of IOR. The explanatory power of the framework is 
assessed by a case study of buyer-supplier relationships from 
manufacturing industry in China. The findings from the case 
study suggest asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, 
and trust are the main determinants influencing coordination 
costs of buyer in IOR. 
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Interorganizational relationships (IORs) are hybrid 
organizational forms which contain elements of both 
markets and hierarchies. Market exchanges are transactions 
between separate organizations, and hierarchical 
relationships are coordinated among organizations. IORs 
coordinate the activities of multiple organizations that are 
separate entities but cooperate with each other about their 
common concerns [15]. 
One important characteristic of IORs is cooperation, it 
refers to an agreement, relationship or exchange between 
two or more actors that is conducted by each of the 
participating parties. In past researches, many scholars 
highlighted the opportunities for mutual gains as the key 
motivation for IORs cooperation, including the gains as 
inter-learning, efficiency profitability, competent advantages, 
risk-resist ability and scale economic effect [15][10][8]. On 
the other hand, some authors have reported high failure rates 
of IORs. From a survey of year 1995 of Australia 
manufacturing organizations, Williams [15] find that 
approximately 38 percent of all respondent firms indicated 
that they had at some stage abandoned a cooperative 
arrangement, the main reasons being loss of control and lack 
of trust followed by the growing coordination cost of the 
arrangement. The wish to remain independent and remain 
control of their business operation was also the main reason 
of the failure. 
A second characteristic of IORs can be described as the 
interdependence between partners. To create the transaction 
                                                        
Detecting determinants on coordination costs of IOR can be 
studied from TCA perspective and RDT perspective 
respectively. The TCA has focused on the appropriation 
concerns in IORs, which originating from pervasive 
behavior uncertainty and contracting problems [3][11]. The 
basic assumption underlying the TCA perspective is that the 
specific governance form is based on an economizing on 
transaction costs. As asset specificity becomes substantial, 
interdependency is deepened and coordination is needed for 
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value of common goals, partners should pool their resources 
together as well as determine the division of labor and the 
interface of activities between them. The resulting 
interdependence between the subtasks the partners agree to 
perform subsequently needs to be coordinated across 
organizational boundaries to ensure a fit between their points 
of contact [5].  
Gulati and Singh [7] have stressed the importance of 
using coordination for managing task interdependence by 
arguing that “concerns about anticipated coordination costs 
are particularly salient in alliances, which can entail 
significant coordination of activities between partners”. As 
the IOR’s tasks become more interdependent and more 
uncertain, the need for coordination and decision making 
increases. Upon that, successful control of coordination 
costs becomes a key point on this cooperation relationship.  
This paper develops a framework to analyze the 
determents on the control of IORs in China, which is built 
on transaction cost analysis (TCA), resource-dependency 
theory (RDT) and notions of social control. We explain the 
framework from a case study of four buyer-supplier 
relationships on the manufacturing industry. Considering the 
availability of data, we will investigate the case from the 
buyer’s perspective. In respect of the complexity and 
difficulty of measure on coordination costs, this paper dose 
not try to examine the structure or measurement of 
coordination costs. Rather, we will focus on the inner 
relation between coordination costs and those influential 
factors. 
This paper, in the next section, provides an analytic 
framework for measuring the determinants on 
interorganizational coordination costs from the TCA and 
RDT perspectives. Next, to explain the power of the 
framework, we employ a case study of buyer-supplier 
relationships from manufacturing industry in China. The 
paper ends with conclusions and directions for future 
researches. 
 
II. Theory and Hypotheses 
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safeguarding the appropriation concerns.  
RDT is a theory rooted in an open system framework, it 
focus on the ability that a firm must obtain necessary 
resources from external organization to survive prosper. The 
premise in RDT is that, firms confronted with an 
unpredictable environment will try to establish 
interorganizational relationships as a strategic response to 
uncertainty. The RDT perspective addresses the importance 
of the resources exchanged and the parties’ ability to control 
the flow of input- and output resources [4].   
When considering the management and control of IORs, 
we think the crucial concern is the magnitude of 
coordination cost. This paper considers both dimensions 
from TCA and RDT as potential determents on coordination 
costs. Besides the common premise of uncertainty 
dimension, we focus on examination of asset specificity 
from TCA as well as other dimensions from RDT and social 
theory, including level of dependence and trust. 
II.1 Coordination costs  
Many researchers argue that the coordination cost outweighs 
the benefits that an alliance can provide. How to control the 
costs is the key to allow a firm to realize the potential gains 
from alliance involvement [2][7]. The problem lies in the 
difficulty to measure it, as coordination costs can not be 
reflect from financial data. Considering business exchange is 
based on contract, Artz and Brush [2] suggest that 
coordination costs should be measured through contracting 
costs. They argue that IOR creates two types of contracting 
costs: the ex ante costs of initially establishing the contract, 
and perhaps more significantly, the ex post costs of 
periodically renegotiating and adjusting those contracts.  
We also adopt the perspective of Artz and Brush and use 
the latter type of costs to measure coordination costs 
occurred in IOR. Therefore we use a similar approach as that 
suggested by Artz and Brush [2] and use the amount of time 
a buyer spends preparing for and actually negotiating supply 
contracts and the extent of conflict in the negotiation as 
indicators of coordination cost. In detail, we consider three 
aspects here: the amount of preparing time before 
negotiation, actually negotiating time and bargaining 
sessions, and the extent of conflict in the negotiations. 
II.2 Independent variables and hypotheses 
Asset Specificity. Asset specificity refers to physical assets, 
production facilities, tools and knowledge tailored to a 
specific relationship that cannot be re-deployed for other 
purposes without the sacrifice of productive value. When 
entering an IOR alliance, participants usually have to invest 
on assets with specific use only in this alliance. As regarding 
the manufacturing industry, a firm should, which is looking 
for appropriate supplier, make great effort on searching and 
evaluating the potential partners. This may consume a lot of 
capital, labor and time to establish and maintain the 
cooperation relationship. Besides, the participants should be 
locked in by special production equipment, computer 
technology and related interorganizational systems that link 
the buyer and supplier production and scheduling activities. 
Substantial asset specificity creates bilateral dependence 
and may reduce the buyer’s control over supplier. Therefore 
the buyer’s coordination costs may rise. Accordingly we 
propose: 
H1: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association between 
buyer’s asset specificity and buyer’s coordination costs is 
positive. 
Uncertainty. According to TCA, uncertainty refers to the 
condition of being able to predict relevant contingences 
surrounding the transaction. There are two types of 
uncertainties. One type is referred as environmental 
uncertainty which means circumstance surrounding an 
exchange cannot be specified ex ante. Artz and Brush [2] 
define environmental uncertainty as the inability to predict 
changes in relevant factors surrounding the buyer-supplier 
exchange, such as the changes in price of product input and 
the demand for end product. Therefore the environmental 
uncertainty makes it more difficult for the buyer and the 
supplier to negotiate contracts. 
Another type of uncertainty is referred as behavioral 
uncertainty which means performance cannot be easily 
verified ex post. The effect of behavioral uncertainty is a 
performance evaluation problem, that is, difficulties in 
verifying whether compliance with established agreements 
has occurred [6][14].  
When anticipated the supplier may have motivation to 
behave high behavioral uncertain, the buyer should consume 
more time and effort in negotiating contract for safeguard 
purpose. Accordingly we propose: 
H2a: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association 
between environmental uncertainty and buyer’s coordination 
costs is positive. 
H2b: In a buyer-supplier alliance, the association 
between supplier’s behavioral uncertainty and buyer’s 
coordination costs is positive. 
Resource-dependency. As RDT provides a holistic 
approach with explicit recognition of economic and social-
political dimensions of IOR [12], Ratnasingham and Kumar 
[13] argue that RDT is concerned with: (1) external forces 
such as e-commerce environment within which the dyad 
operates, (2) internal organizational dimensions that 
structure and shape written policies and procedures, and (3) 
trading partners' interactions in their general exchanges. 
Similar to the descriptions above, this paper takes the 
suggest that these structure arrangement may be embedded 
whining socio-political characteristics of dyad, so we use 
level of dependency and trust as the dimensions of resource 
dependency. 
Regarding the level of dependency reflects the extent 
that the buyer relying on suppliers for the resources they 
cannot produce themselves, so we suggest that: 
H3a: The greater the level of buyer’s dependency on 
supplier exists, the more coordination costs the buyer should 
use. 
Sociologist viewed trust as an individual’s confidence in 
the intentions and capabilities of a relationship partner and 
the belief that a relationship partner would behave as one 
hopes. In IOR’s research, Ratnasingham and Kumar [13] 
indicate trust as a key factor for successful long term trading 
partner relationships, because high extent of trust between 
partners can increase cooperation, thus leading to 
communication openness and information sharing. 
Furthermore, they identified three types of trust existing in 
IOR: competence trust, predictability trust and goodwill trust. 
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Competence trust emphasizes the trust in trading partners’ 
skills, technical knowledge. Predictability trust emphasizes 
the trust in trading partners’ consistent behaviors that 
provide sufficient knowledge for other partners to make 
predictions and judgments due to past experiences. Goodwill 
trust emphasizes the trust in trading partners’ care, concern 
and honesty that allow other partners to further invest in the 
cooperation relationships. 
Summarily, we can view trust as a very lubricant that can 
help mitigate risk and coordinate interactions in business 
relationships. Hence, we argue trust may be an important 
mechanism to reduce the coordination costs, and suggest: 
H3b: The greater the trust between the buyer and the 
supplier exists, the less coordination costs the buyer should 
use. 
The hypotheses are summarized as figure 1. 
 
 
III.   A Case Study 
 
On purpose of comparative, we select two electronic firms 
and two machine-making firms located at Xiamen city for 
in-depth study. These four firms are all stated owned firms 
listed on China Stock Exchange. 
At first stage, we designed a survey based on buyers’ 
perspectives of asset specificity, environmental and 
behavioral uncertainty, level of dependence on supplier and 
trust between the trading partners. Each dimension includes 
several items recorded on 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree) Likert scale. Next, we chose the interviewees as the 
managers of purchasing department or managers being 
responsible for R&D. Then we sent the surveys to 
interviewees beforehand and asked them to choose a 
supplier for certain product. Latter we arranged the 
interview with them separately for detailed discussion. The 
summary data in this case study is provided in table 1. 
The electronic firms are Amoi Electronic Corporation 
and ABC Electronic Corporation. AMOI is a multinational 
electronic enterprise, which highly focuses on developing 
and manufacturing products from telecommunication, digital 
video & audio to IT industry. Nowadays Amoi has been an 
internationally well-known leading manufacturer and 
supplier of mobile phones in China. In 2003, this firm has 
employed about 20,000 persons and the total sales reached 
850 millions US dollar. The interviewees chose the supplier 
producing screens used in mobile telephones. 
The other investigated electronic firm is ABC which is 
an anonym. ABC is the leading professional manufacturer of 
Plastic Film Capacitors in China. Its current total annual 
capacity has reached 2.5 billions pieces, which can be 
ranked first in China and sixth in the world. The total 
employee is less than 2000, and the total sales are about 36 
millions US dollar. The interviewees chose the supplier 
producing metal materials used in capacitors. 
The machine-making firms are Xiamen King Long 
United Automotive Industry Corporation (XMKL) and 
Xiamen Engineering Machinery Corporation (XMEC). 
XMKL has taken up a leading position among domestic 
coach manufacturers and has hired 3500 employees with the 
total sales reached 542 millions US dollar. The interviewees 
chose the supplier producing engines used in coaches. 
XMEC is the key enterprise of large scale for producing 
wheel loaders of the state. The company had been the 
birthplace of the first loader of China. The total employee is 
2000, and the sales in 2003 reached 313 millions US dollar. 
The interviewees chose the supplier producing diesel 
engines used in wheel loaders. 
We firstly compare the negotiate session with their own 
supplier between the two electronic firms. On average, both 
of them respond some extent of complexity in negotiation 
with their suppliers. To reach an agreement with suppliers on 
contract items, it often requires extensive preparation time 
and numerous separate bargaining sessions. This should 
belong to drastic competence and homogeneity of products 
existing in electronic industry. Therefore, electronic firms 
are always tried to strictly control the costs and quality of 
their product to gain competitive advantage in the market. 
This results tough negotiation with suppliers and increase 
the coordination costs of buyers. Investigated data shows 
that the two electronic firms received a same mean value of 
3.6 on coordination costs. Rather, the average value of 
coordination costs for the two machine-making firms is 
much less, which is respectively 1.8 and 2.2. Both of the two 
firms attribute the relative easy bargaining process with 
suppliers to mature market of machinery industry. 
Asset specificity. Amoi has gotten a greater value of 3.4 
on asset specificity, and the value for ABC is 2.2, which is 
separately the max value and min value among the values of 
the four firms. The reason is that the supply of screen for 
mobile phone demands high customization, while the 
material for capacitors is high standardization. The engine 
and diesel engine used by two machine-making firms must 
comply with national standard, which make the asset 
specificity lower. As a whole, higher levels of asset 
specificity increase the difficulty the electronic firms 
experience in negotiation supply contracts. Although the 
coordination costs of ABC do not seem positive to asset 
specificity, this may be influenced by environmental 
uncertainty which increase the coordination. However, from 
the analytical perspective of industrial difference, this result 
can support the positive relationship between asset 
specificity and coordination costs. 
   Environmental uncertainty. As expected, the levels of 
environmental uncertainty of electronic firms are obviously 
higher than those of machine-making firms. ABC gets the 
greatest value of environmental uncertainty, which is not 
only two times than those of machinery firms but is also 
much greater than the value of anther electronic firm. There 
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capacitors usually fluctuate violently. Second, the 
investigated component procured by ABC is metal material, 
which has been floated frequently in recent years suffered 
from international supply. In general, electronic industry 
confronted with drastic competence as well as fast 
technology innovation. Consequently the product prices and 
purchasing costs change frequently, along with the life cycle 
of product shorten. Suffering greater environmental 
uncertainty than machine-making firms, hence, electronic 
firms need more deliberatively negotiate a contract. As a 
result, it suggests that higher levels of environmental 
uncertainty increase the coordination costs of buyer.  
Behavioral uncertainty. Except for the lower value of 
Amoi, the levels of behavioral uncertainty of other three 
firms are almost the same. On account of the tiny distinction 
of these values which is nearly medial value, from this 
investigation we cannot get any conclusion on the 
relationship between behavioral uncertainty and 
coordination costs. 
Level of dependency. Our data reflect that all of the firm 
present high levels of resource dependence on their suppliers 
for investigate. The primary reason is that the interviewees 
of the four firms have happened to choose the focal suppliers 
of their core products as investigating object. Among the 
firm, the level of dependency of ABC is lesser. Because 
there exist many manufacturers can supply metal material, in 
the other hand, ABC may find some other substitute if 
possible. In general, the distinctions among the levels of 
dependency of the four firms are not obviously. As all the 
values are distributed between 3 and 4, so the results suggest 
that the negative between level of dependency and 
coordination costs is not significant. 
Trust. From table 1 we can see, the trust between buyers 
and their focal suppliers is reached a high level in the range 
of 4.29 and 4.57. Considering the greater value of trust 
dimension in the case study, we can conclude that all the 
four firms have tried to establish strong trusty cooperation 
relationships with their focal suppliers. Hence, to some 
extent of degree they have reduced the behavioral 
uncertainty of their trading partners and make the 
negotiation proceeding smoothly. As result, this finding 
support for Hypotheses 3b. 
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
This paper contributes to focus on the determinants of 
coordination costs in IORs by considering the dimensions of 
TCA and RDT. Our model indicates that when studying the 
control of IOR, the economic dimensions and relational 
norms should be putted into consider simultaneously. There 
is little empirical study on such topic based on relationships 
of Chinese organizations, and this study also makes a 
valuable contribution by filling up this gap. 
In this study, we investigate four manufacturing firms 
located in China belonging to different industry. The result 
shows that the Hypotheses 1 and Hypotheses 2a in our 
model have been significantly supported by the empirical 
data. That means in the context of China, the traditional 
TCA research is also useful in study of interorganizational 
relationships. We find that both asset specificity and 
environmental uncertainty directly increases the 
coordination cost of interorganization exchanges. And this 
finding is clearly consistent with previous TCA research [2] 
[1] [9].  
As the dimensions of RDT, this study supports 
Hypotheses 3b significantly. Therefore this finding indicates 
that trust can reduce buyer’s coordination costs by 
mitigating behavioral uncertainty. Besides, trust between 
trading partners also plays a direct role in reducing buyer’s 
coordination costs. On considering the effect of dependency 
level, distinction of the investigated data is quite tiny, and 
our study does not significantly support Hypotheses 3a. One 
possible explanation for this non-significant finding may be 
that the dependency level between trading partners in this 
study are too similar to manifest the different influential 
level. 
While the findings of this study provide valuable insights, 
several future studies need research into the selection of 
determinants of IORs. For instance, our study has provided 
insight from the buyer’s perspective, lacking of supplier’s 
choice. Since the IORs are bilateral relationships, the 
successful control of IOR rely not only the action of the 
focal firm, but on actions of all the participants. Therefore, 
future research would analyze the determinants from the 
supplier’s perspective. Finally, considering the shortage of 
case study method, it requires quantitatively methods using a 
number of IORs from a wide extent. This also remains an 
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Level of resource 
dependence 
Trust 
Amoi 3.6 3.4 2.4 2 3.75 4.29 
ABC 3.6 2.2 3 2.75 3 4.43 
XMKL 1.8 2.6 1.2 2.75 3.5 4.29 
XMEC 2.2 2.4 1.6 2.5 3.25 4.57 
 
  
 
